Index

Not the Main Sponsor

Update, 23 October 2026: this post was rewritten. An earlier version argued that the founder should keep an approval over governance changes until The Gathering could fund itself, and give it up on that day. That position was rejected on 22 October 2026: the founder holds no veto, now or later. The earlier version also said DDT was the only Founding Partner. The Gathering has two founding sponsors, DDT (the first) and Open Strategy Partners (the second), and Boye & Co is a benefit-in-kind sponsor.

The previous post in this series named three failure modes for standards bodies. The third one is mine to answer.

Capture by founder dependency. The specification is excellent, but the project depends on a small group of founders who can be politically exhausted, commercially co-opted, or simply move on. That risk applies to every standards body whose founder also runs a commercial entity in the same market, including The Gathering.

This post states what I'm doing about it, with the conditions written down so they can be checked later.

The commitment

Three parts, all binding.

Digital Domain Technologies Ltd (the commercial entity I run, trading as CogNovaMX) won't exceed 25% of The Gathering Administration Ltd's total annual income in any year. The same cap that applies to every other Founding Partner applies to my company without exception, without transitional concession, and without a founder discount.

I hold no veto over the standard or over The Gathering's governance. Not now, and not as a right that lapses on some future date.

The common MX vocabulary passes to The Gathering. The stewardship position, in the words every surface uses: "CogNovaMX stewards the common MX vocabulary today and dogfoods it first; ownership and governance pass to the Gathering after donation." What passes is the specification text and the mx: namespace. The registry, the audit, the books and the tooling aren't part of it.

The WordPress lesson, restated

WordPress powers somewhere around 43% of the web. The plugin directory at WordPress.org is the supply chain that keeps those sites secure. The WordPress trademark is owned by the WordPress Foundation, a non-profit. The WordPress.org domain, the actual distribution infrastructure that every WordPress site depends on to update plugins and security patches, is owned personally by Matt Mullenweg.

In September 2024 Mullenweg used a keynote at WordCamp US to complain about a competitor's contribution levels. Within weeks, the competitor's access to WordPress.org was blocked and a hundreds-of-thousands-of-sites plugin had its slug taken over. A US court granted a preliminary injunction in December 2024 forcing the restoration. Contributors who asked for governance reforms had their WordPress.org accounts deactivated.

The technical specification of WordPress didn't change during any of this. The governance did, because the distribution servers were owned personally and the foundation that owned the trademark had no operational control over the supply chain they carried.

Suppose I funded The Gathering, owned its registry implementation and held a founder's veto on its governance changes. Suppose it also needed my company's subsidy to keep running. That would be the WordPress shape with a different name. The names of the entities wouldn't save the architecture.

The cap: 25%, no founder exception

The Gathering's funding model already specifies that no single funder may exceed 25% of total annual income. That figure is in the sponsor-and-funding SSOT and will be in the articles of association so it can't be quietly relaxed.

As of October 2026 the rule is in mechanical breach. The Gathering has two founding sponsors, DDT (the first) and Open Strategy Partners (OSP, led by Jeffrey McGuire; the second), and one benefit-in-kind sponsor, Boye & Co, which supports the work in kind rather than in cash. While there are fewer than four funders, no funder can stay at or under 25%, and on the figures recorded so far DDT still provides nearly all of the cash. The transitional clause binds the cap from the end of 2027, with an explicit target of at least five funders at the Founding tier by that date.

The commitment from DDT's side is simple. When the cap binds, no exception applies to me. The transitional clause isn't a back door for the founder's entity to remain dominant after the binding date. Recruiting at least three more founding sponsors by end of 2027 is now the highest-priority work between The Gathering's current state and a defensible structural position.

If that recruitment doesn't happen, the founder's entity doesn't get to ignore the cap. DDT will reduce its contribution to fit, or other emergency funding will be found, or the standards body will operate at a lower level than planned. Founder convenience doesn't override the structural rule.

The cap is checkable. The Gathering publishes an annual transparency report (per the funding model) listing income, expenditure, and funders by tier. Anyone reading it can see what share came from DDT.

The donation: readiness, with a backstop

Until the donation, DDT holds the common MX vocabulary as steward. The donation comes when The Gathering is ready, and readiness is three things anyone can check:

  • a successor steward is named;
  • The Gathering Administration Ltd has articles of its own in place of the model articles it was incorporated with;
  • more than one operator runs it.

There's no fixed date. A date picked now would be either too early to meet or too late to matter. The readiness test has a fixed backstop, so the donation can't be deferred indefinitely while the founder waits for a convenient moment.

After the donation the steward is a seated membership under those articles. I keep a named steward seat, accountable and reachable in the charter's terms, weighted no differently than any other member's.

Why not a veto that expires

An earlier version of this post argued for exactly that: keep the founder's approval while The Gathering depends on DDT money, and give it up the day sponsorship covers the costs. The argument paired the right with the responsibility. Whoever pays as the funder of last resort keeps the final say.

It doesn't survive a second look. A veto is the control the donation exists to end. One that expires on a funding trigger asks every sponsor to trust that the founder will sign it away on the right day, when the founder's own funding decides which day that is. It also keeps the last word in the years when the standard's shape is settled, which are the years that matter most.

The responsibility of last resort doesn't need a veto to go with it. If The Gathering can't fund itself, the cap already says what happens: DDT reduces its contribution, other funding is found, or the body runs at a lower level. None of those requires the founder to hold a switch.

What this asks of every other founder

If you're founding a standards body and your commercial entity sits next to it in the same market, the buyers who matter most will eventually ask the questions the previous post listed. Some of them apply to you specifically.

What percentage of the standards body's income comes from your commercial entity? If the answer is more than a quarter, you have the WordPress shape.

What governance power do you hold personally? If you can veto a governance decision without board agreement, you have the WordPress shape, and a promise to give that power up later doesn't alter what you hold now.

Then there's the handover: when does the thing you steward pass to the body? If the answer is "I have not thought about it" or "when I feel comfortable", you have the WordPress shape, and the day will come when you're asked to defend it without notice.

The structural protection is naming the cap, naming the conditions for the handover, and publishing both in a place a sceptic can find without your help. Doing that doesn't eliminate the risk. It puts limits on it that survive the founder's personal preferences.

What this does not fix

This commitment isn't a complete answer to the founder-dependency failure mode.

It doesn't address the personnel overlap between The Gathering and DDT, where I'm founder of both. With no veto, those who build The Gathering and those who run DDT will still know each other personally and read the same drafts. That kind of social proximity is real and worth naming.

It doesn't address the case where DDT becomes commercially dependent on the standard succeeding. If REGINALD's verifier-side revenue becomes material to DDT's survival, DDT has a financial interest in the standard not changing in ways that hurt REGINALD's competitive position. The safeguard here is the one that applies to every other Founding Partner: the cap, the public minutes, the conflict-of-interest declarations, and the multi-sponsor governance.

It doesn't address the case where the founding cohort fails to grow. If The Gathering never reaches five Founding Partners, the cap stays in breach and the body stays small. The backstop still moves the vocabulary to The Gathering, but a body with one funder is a thin home for it. The honest answer is that the cohort growing is the work.

This commitment takes the founder's switch off the table, writes down when the vocabulary moves, and publishes both. The rest of the work is making The Gathering ready to receive it.

The test for whether any of this holds is the same one I would apply to anyone else's standard: Whose Standard Is It Anyway? sets out the questions to ask, and The Gathering is where the answers are written down in public.

About this page

  • Written by Tom Cranstoun.
  • Last changed on 2026-10-30.